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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This work aims at investigating the effects of the elicitation of leaders’ mood on workers’ 
performance. Recently, researchers were interested in the behavioral effects of mood on 
economic decisions: Andrade and Ho (2007) and Petit (2009) found that in an ultimatum 
game a bad mood increases the possibility to reject an unfair offer. Generally, in the past few 
years economists have recognized the role of emotions, like fear, anger, envy, etc., to 
understanding of human economic behavior; the studies of the Nobel Prize laureate Daniel 
Kahneman had a fundamental role in the implementing process of the psychological insights 
in economic theory.  
 However, few research on the mood effects on economic behavior has been run and, 
as far as I know none has explored whether an individual’s mood could affect economic 
decisions of another individual.  
 To understand whether a relevant causal link exists I conducted an experiment in 
which subjects played in pair; they had different roles: leaders and workers. In the main 
treatment leaders were asked to elicited their mood which was communicated to workers; 
after receiving this information, workers were asked to carry out some tasks: they chose how 
many mathematical questions out of ten try to answers and they wrote the solutions on their 
paper. Per each correct answer leaders received one pound. Finally, leaders could decide if 
and how to reward their co-participants.  
In order to control the effect of the mood elicitation I ran a baseline treatment in which mood 
was not asked and another control treatment in which mood was elicited but not transmitted 
to the co-player. Results are not exactly what I expected but I believe that the outcome surely 
depends on the experimental design and the procedure that I applied. 
The structure of this work is as follows: Section II reviews some theoretical papers 
and some experimental evidence on the influence of emotions in decision making-process; 
Section III outlines the research questions and describes the experimental design and 
procedure. Section IV reports the results of the experiment and a concluding section, Section 
V, summarizes and discusses my main results.  
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II. EMOTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY  
 
In 1789 the philosopher Jeremy Bentham first proposed a “Pannomion”, a complete 
utilitarian code of law: he did not only propose many legal and social reforms but also 
exposed an underlying moral principle on which they should be based, known as “the 
greatest happiness principle” or the principle of utility. He wrote in the Principle of Morals and 
Legislation1: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall 
do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are 
fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think”. Utilitarism was 
born; Bentham viewed utility as the net sum of positive over negative emotions and he 
dedicated a substantial part of his work to a discussion of the determinants and nature of 
emotions.  
When neoclassical economists later constructed their new approach to economics 
upon the foundation of utility, the predominant view of human behavior and motivation was 
that of Homo Economicus, a rational and self-interested individual with no moral value. Their 
economic model, used for explaining and predicting economic behavior in private and public 
sector, typically minimizes or totally ignored the influence of emotions on people’s decision-
making process. With surprise, academic world forgot that, going back at least to Aristotele, 
economic discipline was born as an offshoot of ethics and that even the “father” of the self-
interest motive, Adam Smith, was a professor of philosophy interested in Moral Sentiments2.  
However, although it seems that the most sold textbooks of economics declare the 
only existence of a parsimonious consumer, gradually we have experienced a growing 
empirical evidence of a behavior deviating from the classical theoretical predictions: 
“[…]many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000)”. Indeed, a new strand of research in economics, known as Behavioral 
Economics, aims at incorporating robust psychological insights into economics, thus creating 
                                                          
1 Bentham, 1789.  
2 His work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, provided the ethical, philosophical, psychological and methodological 
basis of his later works including The Wealth of Nations (1776).  
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a model of Homo Sapiens3 which does not act in a total rational way as Homo Economicus 
does. The concept of Bounded Rationality became more popular between economists especially 
after the studies of Nobel Prize laureates Herbert Simon4 and Daniel Kahneman5. The 
presence of other regarding motives during a decision-making process like fairness, 
reciprocity and trust have challenged economists, in particular experimental economists, in 
the last decades.  
Moreover, in the past few years some studies showed a revival of interest in 
emotions6 and have established that they may be an important key to understanding of 
human economic behavior. Jon Elster7 pointed out that emotions can help us to explain 
behavior for which good explanations seems to be lacking.  After he had expounded what 
emotions are, the most common criteria of classification, his features to define emotions and 
the possibility to choose to have (or not) an emotion, he finally focused the attention on how 
they might affect economic behavior. He realized that one of the first answers came from 
neurobiological studies: Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996) argued that “emotional responses 
enhance our capacity to make good decisions, not by guiding us to the best possible decision, but by 
ensuring that we make some decisions in situations where procrastination is likely to be disastrous 
(Elster, 1998)”. According to Elster, those types of responses make individuals irrational 
rather than rational: instead to follow a simple mechanical decision rule, individuals use 
more elaborate procedures with higher opportunity costs8. The Cost-Benefit Model of 
Emotion, which concerns on the interaction between emotions and interest, is indeed 
interesting: emotion is considered a cost or a benefit that entered in the utility function as 
well as the satisfaction derived from material rewards. Other researchers faced the question 
of choice that arises when the agent has to weigh emotional satisfaction against other 
satisfactions: Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden9, for example, in their economic analysis of 
regret assumed that agents weigh satisfaction from actual outcomes and emotions generated 
                                                          
3 Frans van Winden, 2007.   
4 Herbert Alexander Simon received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1978 for his pioneering research into 
the decision-making process within economic organization.    
5 Daniel Kahneman is a Nobel Prize laureate in Economics (2002) “…for his work on the psychology of human 
judgement and reasoning”.  
6 Lewin, 1996; Rabin, 1998; Camerer, 2003; W. Bentley MacLeod, 1996; Hermalin and Isen, 2000. 
7 Elster, 1998. 
8 On the same line Richard Thaler (1980) that argued that “neglect of opportunity costs […] is a frequent source of 
cognitive irrationality”.  
9 Loomes and Sugden, 1982.  
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by counterfactual beliefs. In modeling envy, Hirshleifer assumed that the agent is willing to 
invest resources in making the rival worse off up to the point where he derives more utility 
from making himself better off10.   
Still, none of these analyses rely on emotions which are experienced at the time of 
decision-making: for example, regret and disappointment in Loomes and Sugden’s model are 
expected to be experienced in the future. This is the George Loewenstein’s critique who 
pointed out11 the different types of emotions which economists and psychologists are 
interested in: the former have turned their attention to anticipated emotions while the latter 
have mainly analyzed immediate emotions, those that are experienced at the time of decision-
making12.  
Supported by a large psychological literature on the relationship between emotions, 
behavior and decision-making (Isen, 2000; Izard et al., 1984;  Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; 
Ortony et al. 1988), and by a growing experimental evidence, it is very likely that economists 
will turn out to consider and to implement immediate emotions (e.g. anger, fear) in their 
models since their influence on human behavior are highly systematic and somehow 
predictable.  
A relatively early experimental paper is Pillutla and Murnigham (1996): responders 
in an ultimatum game experiment were asked, after each of a series of offers, the question 
“How do you feel?”; answers were rated for expressions of anger and the rejection of offers 
was found to be related to this measure. Bosman and van Winden (2002) introduced the 
power-to-take game to investigate the importance of emotions for negative reciprocity in a 
situation of appropriation. In several experiments they asked subjects to self-report on their 
feelings using a list of different emotions (van Winden, 2001; Bosman and van Winden, 2002). 
Reuben and van Winden (2005, 2007) analyzed the interaction of emotions and fairness 
norms, and the role of affect on negative reciprocity: in a three-player power-to-take game 
with a proposer matched with two responders, they found that when responders knew each 
other they were more likely to punish the proposer and to coordinate their punishment than 
                                                          
10 Hirshleifer, 1987.  
11 Loewenstein, 2000. 
12 Such emotions belong, according to Loewenstein, to a wider range of visceral factors (Loewenstein, 1996), which 
affects behavior in directions that are different from that dictated by a weighing of the long-term costs and benefits 
of various actions.    
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two strangers did. Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz and van Winden (2007) were also 
interested in reciprocity and emotions: they utilized a bargaining game13 and a psychological 
self-report to measure the effect of emotions on negotiation; Hopfensitz and van Winden 
(2006) and Bosman and van Winden (2008) investigated on emotions involved in situation of 
dynamic choice, risk and uncertainty14: anticipated and experienced emotions appeared to 
influence decision-making and the awareness of a global risk reduced the amount invested in 
the risky option.  
There are few studies that have focused on a single emotion per time: Zizzo (2003, 
2004, 2008) devoted a substantial part of his research to the evaluation of the rationality of 
anger; he argued that anger is an emotion which arises from significant cognitive processing 
and which is likely to determine a behavioral response directed against the object of anger. 
His claim on the rationality of anger took into account neurobehavioral and psychological 
evidence: “the medial and possibly other prefrontal cortex regions play an important role in anger 
processing, whereas the amygdale does not (Zizzo, 2003)”. From his point of view, anger cannot 
be qualified as rational in any case but it will depend on the economic setting. A related work 
is Bolle, Tan and Zizzo (review by Zizzo, 2009) that analyzes the impact of effects of elicited 
valuation of anger on behavior in vendettas: they found out that anger and envy guided 
agents to steal from their rivals systematically until they have the possibility.  
Another field not explored enough so far concerns the effects of mood on economic 
behavior; mood is sometimes wrongly used as a synonymous of emotion: “mood lasts longer 
than emotions and […] can be precipitated by an emotion: feeling unfairly rejected for a job promotion 
may lead to an episode of anger and […] that it may become an angry mood (Zizzo, 2006)”. The 
psychological literature on mood effects is quite large (Forgas and Vargas, 2000; Bower, 1981, 
1991; Forgas, 1989, 1990, 1992; Mayer et al. 1992) while  there is not much work in economics 
which has investigated how mood can affect economic decisions. Andrade and Ho (2007), 
Petit (2009) and Masters (CREED-CeDEx-CBESS Meeting, 2009) utilized one of the mood 
induction techniques, a video clip, to induce a bad or a good mood in participants of their 
experiments in order to evaluate the impact of mood on judgment and decision making.  
                                                          
13 Other researchers utilized the ultimatum game in order to examine the human punishing behavior and the 
emotion expressions after the rejection of an unfair offer (Xiao and Houser, 2007).  
14 A related paper is Maffioletti and Santoni, 2007.  
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As far as the author knows, no experimental work has been conducted to find out 
whether an individual’s mood can affect the behavior of other individuals: generally, it has 
been explored the effect of individual’s own mood on his personal decisions but what about 
the link between, for example, the principals’ mood and agents’ behavior? This work will try 
to investigate on that link; the idea came from Patterson, Warr and West15 who believe that 
behavior is a function both of a person’s characteristics and the nature of his or her 
environment; in this sense environmental features in work setting can be a factor or a 
possible predictor of organizational performance. Supported by Brief and Weiss’s article16 
which enumerates the role of leaders as an exogenous factor in the production of mood and 
emotions in the workplace, I decided to apply an experimental method wishing to answer to 
the following question: does principal’s mood affect agent’s performance? In the following 
section I will describe more specifically the hypotheses I would like to test and the 
experimental design.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Patterson et al., 2004. 
16 Brief and Weiss, 2002. 
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
 
a. Research Questions 
 
In designing my experiment I had one purpose in mind: I wanted to see whether, 
and to what extent, leaders’ mood affect workers’ performance; actually, I also considered in 
my analysis the effect of leaders’ mood on their own  decisions.  
I did not know whether workers are more likely to put more effort when they are 
aware of their leaders’ mood (good mood or bad mood) as well as I did not know whether 
leaders are more likely to reward their workers when they are in a good or in a bad mood.  
Generally, I cannot be sure of which patterns held. 
However, while I do expect leaders to be more willing to reward workers when they 
are in a good mood, I prefer to not assume any direction about workers’ behavior. 
Generally, I can formulate the following hypotheses to test: 
 
Hp 1: Leaders’ Mood does not affect Workers’ Performance 
against  
Hp 1b: Leaders’ Mood does affect Workers’ Performance 
and 
Hp 2: Leaders’ Mood does affect Their Offer Decisions 
against  
Hp 2b: Leaders’ Mood does not affect Their Offer Decisions 
 
b. Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia from the 23rd to the 25th 
June 2009.  In total 77 subjects took part to the experiment17, almost all were students; they 
                                                          
17 On average 24 per treatment; some observations were dropped because people did not show-up and I could not 
get an even number of participants per session. 
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received a show-up fee of 3 pounds and an additional amount of money depending on their 
luck and/or skills; on average, subjects received 8 pounds.  
The experiment, which consists of three treatments, is designed around the desire to 
understand the effect of mood elicitation on workers’ performance: in treatment C, the main 
treatment, mood is elicited and transmitted to the co-participant; in treatment B mood is 
elicited but not transmitted to anyone; in treatment A, the baseline, mood is not elicited.  
  
Emotion Elicitation 
Not ask for it 
Ask for it and No 
Transmission  
Ask for it and 
Transmission to co-
player 
Treat. A Treat. B Treat. C 
 
Three sessions have been run per each treatment; I deliberatively alternated the sessions 
during the day in order to avoid underlying time-of-day effects. Two rounds were conducted 
in each session; participants were in the same room, with a partition dividing them. The 
experiment was paper and pencil and communication was handled manually via paper 
“Communication Forms”. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Subjects played in pair; they were randomly divided into groups: one group was 
referred to as participant A (the Leaders) and the other as participant B (the Workers). On the 
arrival in the lab, they were randomly allocated an ID and asked to sign the consent form. 
The instruction were read at the beginning of the session aloud; participants had their copy 
of the instruction that could consult at any moment. The instruction were followed by some 
questions of understanding. Before to start the experiment, participants spent 10 minutes for 
the practice round.  
In treatment C workers were asked to wait at the beginning of the round: leaders 
were asked to answer to a question on their mood and to write their answer down. There 
were three facial expressions for mood elicitation that Eckel and Wilson (1999) have largely 
experimented in their research: a smiley face for a good mood, a normal expression for a 
normal mood and a sad expression for a bad mood.  
Once leaders have provided their answers the experimenter wrote them down on the 
Communication Form and communicated them to their co-participants (to workers). Then, 
leaders were asked to wait while workers were busy to deal with the effort task. I employed 
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a task previously used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and then in Oswald, Proto and 
Sgroi (2009) and Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009): subjects needed to sum algebraically a 
sequence of five 2-digit numbers and to write the results down. There were 5 questions of 
this type. Other 5 questions required to sum the numbers one in a table constituted only by 
numbers zero and one. This effort task was implemented by Abeler (CREED-CeDEx-CBESS 
Meeting, 2009).  
Once workers decided how many questions to answer and calculated the solution, the 
experimenter checked the number of correct answers and communicated them to the co-
participants. The latter, leaders, received one pound per each correct answer given by the 
workers matched with them.  
Finally, leaders made a decision: how to split, if they wish, the amount of money received.  
In the literature of the principal-agent theory this game between worker and leader is 
framed as Bonus Contract: leader is free to reward worker for his effort. The choice of this 
type of contract was straightforward since it seemed to me direct and easy to understand.  
Treatment B is very similar to treatment C in the procedure but the experimenter did not 
communicated the answers on mood to participants “Workers”; in treatment A the elicitation 
of mood was not asked at all.     
 For all the experimental material see appendix A. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
a. Univariate Analysis 
 
Workers’ Performance 
 
In treatment B and C a high number of participants whose role was “Worker” answered 
correctly to all the 10 questions (19 out of 24 and 20 out of 26 respectively) as we can observe 
from the graphs of the frequencies: 
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Graph 1. Frequencies N. Correct Answers Treat 
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Graph 2. Frequencies N. Correct Answers Treat 
B 
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Graph 3. Frequencies N. Correct Answers Treat 
C 
 
 
Generally, subjects answered correctly to more questions in the second round than in 
the first one; the 75% of the participants answered correctly to all the questions in the second 
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round while in the first round only 61% answered correctly to all the questions; the 13.89% 
answered correctly to not less than 8 questions in the second round while the same 
proportion answered correctly to not less 7 questions18 in the first round.  
Graphs 4 and 5 show the frequency distributions of the number of correct answers in the first 
round and in the second round:   
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Graph 4. Frequencies N. Correct Answers - first 
round 
Graph 5. Frequencies N. Correct Answers – 
second round 
 
Subjects answered correctly to more questions in the second round of each treatment 
too: if I consider the target of ten correct answers I can count 6 out 10 in the second round 
compared to 4 out of 10 in the first round of treatment A; 10 out 12 in the second round 
compared to 9 out 12 in the first round of treatment B and 11 out of 13 in the second round 
compared to 9 out 13 in the first round of treatment C19.  
 
On average participants in Treatment C answered correctly to 9.5 questions; in 
treatment B to 9.2 and in treatment A to 8.81; moreover, the mean of treatment C is associated 
to the lowest variance (Std. Dev. = 1.14):   
 
Tab. 1. Descriptive statistics of the variable “Number of Correct Answers” 
Num. 
CorrectAnswers 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Treat A 22 8.818182 1.500361 4 10 
Treat B 24 9.208333 2.245366 0 10 
Treat C 26 9.5 1.140175 5 10 
                                                          
18 Tables 3 and 4 in appendix B.  
19 Graphs from 1 to 6 of frequency distribution in appendix B.  
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In order to check whether the mean of treatment A differs significantly from the 
mean of treatment B and C I can run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test (or Mann-Whitney 
U Test20): the mean of treatment A differs significantly from the mean of treatment C (p-value 
= 0.028) and from the mean of treatment B (p-value = 0.029) while the mean of treatment B is 
not statistically different from the mean of treatment C (p-value = 0.893).  
 
However, it should be more correct to consider the ratio between the correct answers 
and the attempted questions in order to evaluate the real effort of Workers. 
We can observe from the following table that only 4 participants decided to attempt less than 
10 questions: 
 
Tab. 2. Descriptive statistics of the variable “Number of Attempted Questions” 
Number of attempted 
questions 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 1 1.39 1.39 
5 3 4.17 5.56 
10 68 94.44 100.00 
Total 72 100.00  
  
                                                          
20 This non-parametric statistic is used to test whether two independent groups have been drawn from the same 
population. The null hypothesis is that 2 groups of observations, say A and B, have the same distribution.  
In this case, we are going to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H0A: Treatment C and Treatment A have the same distribution 
against 
H1A: Treatment C and Treatment A have not the same distribution 
 
and  
H0B: Treatment C and Treatment B have the same distribution 
against 
H1B: Treatment C and Treatment B have not the same distribution 
 
and 
H0C: Treatment A and Treatment B have the same distribution 
against 
H1C: Treatment A and Treatment B have not the same distribution 
 
 
If H0  is true, we would expect the average ranks in each of the two groups to be about equal. If the sum of the ranks 
for one group is very large (or very small) then we may have reason to suspect that the samples were not drawn 
from the same population.  
This test is suitable for two independent samples, no matter the number of the sample.   
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The 94.44% of Workers decided to attempt all the 10 questions.  
 
On average Workers answered correctly to the 93% of the attempted questions21; in 
particular, Workers of Treatment C answered correctly to the 96% of the attempted questions, 
the higher percentage compared to the other 2 treatments22. The percentage is statistically 
significant: the p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test between treatment A and C 
and between treatment A and B are less than 0.01, while there is no significant difference 
between the ratio of treatment C and B.   
 
Leaders’ Offer  
 
Generally, the 34.72% of participants whose role was “Leaders” offered 5, the 15.28% offered 3 
and 13.89% gave 0; only 10 offers out of 72 were higher than 5 and only 3 times 10 was given 
to the co-participant. After 5, 3 and 0, four was the most frequent offer: 9.72% (Tab. 3 
Appendix B). 
In treatment A offers 4 and 5 had the same frequency (27.27%), the highest one; zero 
and one were the second most frequent offers of the treatment (13.64%). None offer was 
higher than 8. In treatment B 10 times was offered 5 (41.67%); the offer zero was given 
slightly more often than in treatment A (20.83%) and twice was given ten (8.33%). In 
treatment C again the most frequent offer was 5 (34.62%) while 3 was the second most 
frequent offer (30.77%); four times out 26 an offer greater that 5 was made (15.38%) and only 
once the offer 10, the maximum offer, occurred (Graphs 6, 7 and 8).  
 
 
                                                          
21 Tab. 1 appendix B.  
22 Tab. 2 appendix B. 
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Graph 6. Frequencies Offer Treat A Graph 7. Frequencies Offer Treat B 
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Graph 8. Frequencies Offer Treat C  
 
On average, offers on Treatment C were higher (4.28) while in Treatment B and A the 
offer was on average 3.7; treatment C has the smallest variance between offers (2.23) while in 
treatment B offers seem to vary more than in other treatments (2.85). However, difference in 
offer decision is not statistically significant between treatments23.  
The minimum offer in all the three treatments is zero while 10 was the maximum offer in 
treatment B and C and 8 in treatment A, as table 4 shows: 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 I ran the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test between treatment A and B, between treatment A and C and between 
treatment B and C: p-value is always > 0.1.  
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Tab. 3. Descriptive statistics of the variable “Offer” 
Offer Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Treat A 22 3.772727 2.408948 0 8 
Treat B 24 3.708333 2.851074 0 10 
Treat C 26 4.288462 2.236842 0 10 
 
It may be more interesting to discuss offers in relation to the number of correct 
answers: I am interested to see how leaders decided to split the amount of money received24. 
25 out 72 half of the amount received was given back; 8 out of 72 more than half of the 
received amount was offered and 10 out 72 zero was offered whatever the amount of money 
received. All the numbers of correct answers with the correspondent offers are in the 
following table:  
 
Tab. 4. Number of Correct Answers and Offers 
 Number of Correct Answers 
Offer 0 4 5 7 8 9 10 Total  
0 1 1 1 0 4 1 2 10 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
3 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 11 
4 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 7 
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
5 0 0 0 0 0 2 23 25 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Total  1 1 2 2 9 8 49 72 
         
In treatment C the mean of the ratio between the offer and the number of correct 
answers is the highest one (0.42), compared to those of treatment A (0.40) and B (0.37), with 
the lowest variance meaning that in treatment C generally subjects were more willing to give 
a bigger amount of money compared to treatment A and B. However, there is no statistically 
                                                          
24 Per each correct answer given by workers leaders received 1 pound.  
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significant difference between treatments as suggests the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test (p-
value > 0.125). 
 
Tab. 5. Descriptive statistics of the variable “Offer/ Number of Correct Answers”, per treatment 
 
Offer/N. 
CorrectAnswers 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Treat A 22 0.4071364 0.2602825 0 1 
Treat B 24 0.3773333     0.2829968          0 1 
Treat C 26 0.4228462     0.2459443          0 1 
 
 
Leaders’ Mood 
 
I remind that, according to the experimental design, subject whose role was “Leaders” were 
not asked for their mood in treatment A but they were in treatment B and C; moreover, 
leaders’ mood was communicated to their co-participants only in treatment C. I remind also 
that subjects could choose between three types of faces in order to elicit their current mood: 
an smiley face for a good mood, a face with a normal expression for a normal mood and a 
face with a sad expression for a bad mood.  
 In Treatment B the 66.67% of participants stated that they were happy, the 25% of 
them were neither in a good mood or in a bad mood; only the 8.33% of them declared to be in 
a bad mood. In treatment C the 57.69% of subjects were in a good mood while the rest of 
them, the 42.31%, was in a normal mood; none of them was in a bad mood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 As for the previous variables I ran the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test between treatment A and B, between 
treatment A and C and between treatment B and C: in all the cases p-value is > 0.1. 
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Graph. 9. Leaders’ Mood 
 
 
It might be not surprising that subjects sometimes declared to be in a different mood 
over rounds: in treatment B, 2 subjects out of 6 elicited a different mood over the experiment, 
while in treatment C 3 subjects out of 6 ticked a different facial expression over time. On 
average, subjects ‘ mood was 1.41 (where 1 is a good mood, 2 a normal mood and 3 a bad 
mood) in treatment B as well as in treatment C; however, treatment B is characterized by a 
higher variance (0.65 compared to 0.50 in treatment C).  
 
Table 6 shows the experimental observations organized by mood: mood not elicited, 
good mood, normal mood and bad mood. The observations are divided by treatment per 
column: treatment A (TA), treatment B (TB) and treatment C (TC), and by the values of some 
variables (number of attempted questions, number of correct answers, offer) per row.  
 Values of TA are only in the first column; for a good mood a high number of questions was 
attempted and a high number of correct answers was given. Similar consideration for a 
normal mood and a bad mood.  
The variable offer seems to take different value whatever the mood is.  
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Table 6. Experimental observations 
 
 Mood 
 
 mood not elicited good mood normal mood bad mood 
 
 
TA TB TC All TA TB TC All TA TB TC All TA TB TC All 
 
Number of 
Attempted 
Questions 
0   
   
  1 
 
1   
   
  
   5 1 
  
1   1 1 2   
   
  
   
10 
21 
  
21   14 14 28   6 11 17   2 
 
2 
 
Number of 
Correct 
Answers 
0   
   
  1 
 
1   
   
  
   4 1 
  
1   
   
  
   
  
   5   
   
  1 1 2   
   
  
   7 2 
  
2   
   
  
   
  
   8 5 
  
5   1 1 2   
 
2 2   
   9 4 
  
4   1 1 2   
 
1 1   1 
 
1 
10 10 
  
10   12 12 24   6 8 14   1 
 
1 
 
Offer 
0 3 
  
3   3 1 4   1 1 2   1 
 
1 
1 3 
  
3   1 
 
1   
   
  
   2   
   
  2 
 
2   1 1 2   
   3 1 
  
1   
 
4 4   2 4 6   
   4 6 
  
6   
 
1 1   
   
  
   4,5   
   
  
 
1 1   
   
  
   5 6 
  
6   9 6 15   
 
3 3   1 
 
1 
6   
   
  
 
1 1   1 
 
1   
   7 1 
  
1   
 
1 1   
   
  
   8 2 
  
2   
   
  
   
  
   9   
   
  
   
  
 
1 1   
   10   
   
  1 
 
1   1 1 2   
                      
 
A bivariate evaluation between mood and offer decision can be carried out analyzing 
the Spearman’s correlation coefficient26: the coefficient is negative (-0.0027), suggesting a 
negative relationship between the variable but it is not statistically significant (p-value = 
0.9822). The same test can be run between mood and the number of attempted question and 
                                                          
26 The Spearman correlation coefficient is a non-parametric coefficient of correlation which perform better than the 
sample correlation coefficient, for example, when outliers are present. I believe that this is the case since during the 
session some subjects communicated to the experimenter that they had taken the wrong decision in the previous 
round and that they were willing to behave differently in the future. 
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between mood and the number of correct answers: both coefficients (0.06 and 0.28 
respectively) are small and positive (there is a positive relation between variables); however, 
the former coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.6012). On the contrary, 
coefficient between mood and number of correct answer presents a p-value less than 0.05: 
this variable is not correlated to mood variable as instead the others are. Table 6 shows all the 
coefficient values with the number of observations and the level of significance: 
 
Tab. 7. Spearman’s correlation coefficient 
 Mood 
Number of 
attempted 
questions 
Number of 
correct answers 
Offer 
Mood 
1.0000 
72 
   
Number of 
attempted 
questions 
0.0626 
72 
0.6012 
1.0000 
72 
  
Number of 
correct 
answers 
0.2800 
72 
0.0172 
0.4808 
72 
0.0000 
1.0000 
72 
 
Offer 
-0.0027 
72 
0.9822 
0.3503 
72 
0.0026 
0.4770 
72 
0.0000 
1.0000 
72 
 
Finally, I plot the Number of Correct Answers against Offer (Graph 10): the 
observations are all under or on the 45 degree line due to the fact that offer could not be 
higher than the Number of Correct Answers. I can observe the presence of an outlier (value 
zero) and a positive linear dependence between offer and the number of correct answers: it 
does maybe not surprise that higher the number of correct answers is higher the offer is.  
Graph 11 shows the relationship between offer and mood: offer variable is constrained 
between 0 and 10; mood variable can take value 0 (mood not elicited), 1 (good mood), 2 
(normal mood) and 3 (bad mood). It seems that whatever leaders’ mood is they can make a 
high offer or a low one.  
The graphs 12 and 13 show the data with “Number of Correct Answers” as 
dependent variable: I can observe a high values of the variable with respect to any type of 
mood; moreover, values of the dependent variable are high too whatever the offer of the 
previous round is.  
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Graph 10. Scatter Offer against Number of 
Correct Answers  
Graph 11. Scatter Offer against Mood  
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Graph 12. Scatter Number of Correct 
Answers against Mood 
Graph 13. Scatter Number of Correct 
Answers against Offer previous Round  
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From the data analysis conducted so far I can withdraw some conclusion but it is necessary a 
multivariate analysis in order to find out whether subjects are affected by mood when they 
are asked to make their decisions.   
 
b. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Due to the limited range (0 -10) of the variables “Number of Correct Answers” and “Offer” 
that I am going to study, I employ two-sided censored Tobit regression with a random 
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components error term (with subjects as the random components)27.  The Model that I am 
going to use is the Random Effect Tobit Model28. 
 
Workers’ Performance  
 
In order to study the workers’ performance and to investigate whether it is affected by 
leaders’ mood I consider the Number of Correct Answers as the dependent variable. The 
following table shows the results of the regression: 
 
 Tab. 8. Panel regression 1 
 
Number of Obs 72    
Number of groups 36     
Obs per Group  Min = 2 
Avg = 2.0 
Max = 2    
Wald test chi2(9) 246.97 
Prob>chi2 0.000 
Log Likelihood -62.052227 
Obs Summary 1 left-censored obs 
22 uncensored obs 
59 right-censored obs 
 
 
                                                          
27 The random effects model adjusts the standard errors of the estimates to account for repeated observations across 
the same subjects.  
28
 The Tobit Model supposes that there is a latent variable, y*, that linearly depends on a vector of explanatory 
variables, X; the latent variable is continuous and its range may be constrained. I wish to estimate the following 
model:  
 
y*it = x’itβ + αi + εit 
where 
i = 1, …, 36 pairs of subjects 
t = 1,2          rounds 
 
and where 
yit = y*it        if y*it > 0 
 
yit = 0         if y*it ≤ 0 
 
In this model y* is the latent variable, X the matrix of the explanatory variables, and αi and εit i.i.d. are normally 
distributed.  
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N. Correct 
Answers 
Coef.    Std. Err.       z  P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Offer prev. 
Round 
 
0.4222201    
 
0.0726404      
 
5.81    
 
0.000      
 
0.2798474     
 
0.5645927 
N. Correct 
Answers 
prev. Round 
-1.056416     0.092935    -11.37    0.000     -1.238565    -0.8742662 
Round -0.1828727    0.2851823 -0.64    0.521     -0.7418197     0.3760744 
M2 -20.99601    4439.615     -0.00    0.996     -8722.482      8680.49 
M4 -21.3163    4439.615     -0.00    0.996     -8722.802     8680.169 
T2 22.07421    4439.615      0.00    0.996     -8679.411      8723.56 
T3 3.793573    0.4846708 7.83    0.000      2.843636      4.74351 
M2T3 20.58984    4439.615      0.00    0.996     -8680.896     8722.075 
Gender -0.8068579    0.3701307     -2.18    0.029     -1.532301    -0.0814151 
School of 
Economics 
5.31153    0.5805586      9.15    0.000      4.173656     6.449404 
Graduate  7.057268    0.5925445     11.91    0.000      5.895902     8.218633 
const 12.21126    0.9994435     12.22    0.000      10.25239     14.17013 
Sigma_u 3.585286    0.2896824     12.38    0.000      3.017519     4.153053 
Sigma_e 0.599308    0.0961271      6.23    0.000      0.4109024     0.7877136 
rho 0.9728178    0.0084309                       0.9515732     0.9856485 
 
 
I regress the dependent variable on mood dummies – M2 (good mood) and M4 (bad 
mood) – and on treatment dummies – T2 (treatment B) and T3 (treatment C). I exclude M3, 
normal mood and T1, the baseline treatment in order to avoid the dummies trap and to 
comment the results in comparison with them.  
Good mood or bad mood do not affect the dependent variable (p-value 0.996 for both 
dummies): neither a good mood or a bad mood is less likely (negative coefficients) than a 
normal mood to influence the number of correct answers. While the coefficient of treatment 2 
dummy is not statistically significant, the coefficient of treatment 3 dummy is strongly 
significant (p-value = 0.000); the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that subjects are almost 
four times more likely to answer correctly to the questions in treatment 3 compared to the 
baseline treatment.  
The coefficient of the variable “round” (-0.1829) is not statistically significant (p-value 
= 0.521): the number of correct answers does not change in a relevant way over time.  
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The dependent variable strongly depends on the offer of previous round29 (p-value = 
0.000): subjects are more likely to answer correctly when the offer of previous round is 
higher. The coefficient of offer of previous round is 0.422, that means that subjects are more 
willing to answer correctly to “almost” one more question each time that offer increases of 2, 
ceteris paribus. The use of the explanatory variable “offer previous round” causes in this 
regression an endogeneity issue: the offer of previous round is a function of the dependent 
variable “number of correct answers”: subjects are more willing to try to answer correctly to 
the questions when offer of previous round was high, but the offer may be high when 
subjects have answered correctly to the questions and so on. To avoid this problem I 
introduce in the model the explanatory variable “number of correct answers of previous 
round” such that I run a lagged regression on  the dependent variable; the coefficient (-1.056)  
is negative and strongly significant (p-value = 0.000): per each correct answer in the previous 
round subjects are less likely to give a correct answer in the current round, ceteris paribus. The 
use of the autoregressive variable, which is significant, allowed us to state in favor of the 
causal link between the offer of the previous round and the number of correct answers of the 
current round.  
In order to study the effect of the mood elicitation I introduce in the regression some 
interaction terms: M2T3 (effect of the elicitation and transmission of the good mood) and 
M4T3 (effect of the elicitation and transmission of the bad mood). Other two interaction 
terms are necessary for the comparison: M2T2, elicitation of a good mood but not transmitted 
and M4T2, elicitation of the bad mood but not transmitted. Only M2T3 appears in the 
regression since the M2T2, M4T2 and M4T3 terms are dropped because of collinearity. Even 
though different regressions have been run with some interaction terms to try to avoid the 
problem (only with M2T2 and M4T2, only with M2T3 and M4T3, only with M2T2 and M2T3, 
only with M4T2 and M4T3) M2T2, M4T2 and M4T3 terms are dropped. An explanation of the 
collinearity issue might be that none declared to be in a bad mood in treatment 3.  
By the way, even though the sign of the interaction term M2T3 in the regression might be 
expected – when subjects know that their leaders are in good mood they are more likely to 
                                                          
29 For round 2 offer of the previous round is equal to the offer of round 1, whereas for round 1 offer of the previous 
round is equal to offer of the practice round: I decided to keep those observations because pairs were fixed since the 
practice round and thus the offer values created in workers some expectation.  
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answer correctly to the questions – the coefficient is not statistically significant, thus leaving 
place to other considerations.   
Finally, I can discuss the coefficients of some explanatory variables such as gender, 
School attended and graduate: male are less likely to answer correctly to the questions than 
female; there is strong evidence (p-value = 0.000) that graduate students and students 
attending the School of Economics are more likely to answer correctly to the questions. 
The Between variance, σ2 u , is greater than the within variance, σ2 e: 3.585286 and 
0.599308   respectively. This means that difference between pairs is more significant than the 
difference across time.  
 
I remind that in this panel regression the number of pair is 36 and time consists of 2 
rounds – round 1 and 2. Hence, we have 72 observations. 
The Wald test ( = 246.97 which follows a Chi-square with 9 degree of freedom) is strongly 
significant (p-value = 0.000): overall coefficients of this regression are significant, the model is 
a good one to explain the dependent variable.  
A final consideration on the censored observation of Tobit regression I ran. There is one left-
censored observation and 49 right-censored observations: only one subject answered 
correctly to none question and 49 participants, the big majority, answered correctly to all the 
questions. The rest of the participant (22 uncensored observations) answered correctly to a 
number of questions between 0 and 10.  
 
Leaders’ Offer 
 
Offer is now the dependent variable of the panel regression showed in table 8. There is a 
strong evidence that offer depends on the number of correct answers (p-value = 0.002): higher 
the number of correct answers is higher (more than 60%) the offer will be, ceteris paribus. The 
sign of the variable “round” suggests that offer is lower in the second round but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.237). M2 and M4 are mood dummies; as 
in the previous regression, I did not introduce M3 (normal mood) to avoid the dummy trap. 
It seems that subjects in a good mood are more likely to offer more than subjects in a normal 
mood and on the contrary subjects in a bad mood are less likely to reward their co-
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participants than subjects in a normal mood. However, the coefficients of mood dummies are 
not statistically significant as well as the coefficients of treatment dummies T2 and T3.    
Likewise the regression on the number of correct answers, in this regression I use 
some interaction terms between the mood dummies and treatment dummies to analyze the 
effects of the elicitation of mood; however, like the previous regression some of them (M2T3, 
M4T2 and M4T3) are dropped because of collinearity30. The coefficient of the interaction term 
in the regression, M2T2 – effect of a good mood elicited but not transmitted – is not 
significant (p-value = 0.789). Subjects’ good mood, elicited even though not transmitted does 
not affect the offer decision as well as other explanatory variables (graduate, School of 
Economics and gender).  
The Between variance, σ2 u , is greater than the within variance, σ2 e: 2.334407   and 1.105042   
respectively. This means that difference between pairs is more significant than the difference 
across time.  
 
Tab 9. Panel regression 2 
Offer Coef.    Std. Err.       z P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ca 0.6546836    0.2141978      3.06    0.002      0.2348637 1.074504 
Round -0.3526104    0.2983102     -1.18    0.237     -0.9372877     0.2320669 
M2 0.3799511    0.8731105 0.44    0.663     -1.331314     2.091216 
M4 -1.269619    2.803038     -0.45    0.651     -6.763472     4.224234 
T2 -0.1397684    1.447236     -0.10    0.923     -2.976298     2.696761 
T3 0.1265946    1.169135       0.11    0.914     -2.164869     2.418058 
M2T2 -0.4227415    1.582437     -0.27    0.789     -3.524261     2.678778 
Gradbs -1.262243    1.425608     -0.89    0.376     -4.056383     1.531897 
Ecobs 1.126813    1.256828       0.90    0.370     -1.336524      3.59015 
Genderbs  0.1837613    0.9094938      0.20    0.840     -1.598814     1.966336 
const -0.9495325    2.343713     -0.41    0.685     -5.543126      3.64406 
Sigma_u 2.334407    0.3611563      6.46    0.000      1.626553      3.04226 
Sigma_e 1.105042    0.1481913 7.46    0.000      .8145924     1.395492 
Rho 0.8169396    0.0646441                       .6649391     0.9164444 
                                                          
30 Because, for example, none in treatment 3 declared to be in a bad mood.  
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Number of Obs 72    
Number of groups 36     
Obs per Group  Min = 2 
Avg = 2.0 
Max = 2    
Wald test chi2(10) 12.61 
Prob>chi2 0.2464 
Log Likelihood -134.57061 
Obs Summary 10 left-censored obs 
59 uncensored obs 
3 right-censored obs 
 
  Equally to the previous regression, the number of pair is 36 and time consists of 2 
rounds – round 1 and 2. Hence, we have 72 observations. 
The p-value of the Wald test ( = 12.61 which follows a Chi-square with 10 degree of freedom) 
is less than 0.05 ( = 0.2464): it seems that the model is not the most appropriate to explain the 
dependent variable.  
About the censored observation: there are 10 left-censored observation and 3 right-censored 
observations: ten subjects decided to offer nothing to their co-participants and only 3 offered 
10, the maximum amount of money that they could receive. The rest of the participant (59 
uncensored observations) made an offer between 0 and 10. 
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V. DISCUSSION  
 
The univariate and multivariate analysis of the previous section has tested the null 
hypotheses of the experiment and allows me to get the following results:  
 
Result 1. Leaders’ Mood does not affect Workers’ Performance  
 
Result 2: Leaders’ Mood does not affect Their Offer Decisions  
 
As you can see from graph 12 the number of correct answers is independent from mood; 
moreover, the coefficients of mood dummies and the coefficient of the interaction term in the 
panel regression 1 are not statistically significant: leaders’ mood does not affect workers’ 
performance.  
I notice from the graphs of the frequency distribution of the variable “Number of Correct 
Answers” (graphs 1-3) that workers answered correctly to more questions in treatment C and 
B respect to the baseline treatment; moreover, the difference in mean between treatment A 
and treatment C and between treatment A and treatment B is actually significant (as the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test suggests). However, the difference in mean between treatment 
C and treatment B is not statistically significant: in treatment B workers did not know their 
leaders’ mood (mood was elicited but not transmitted) and so, from the point of view of 
workers treatment B and C are similar31. If the elicitation of mood have influenced workers’ 
effort I would have expected significant difference between treatment C and A and between 
treatment C and B too. Since there is not between the latter couple of treatments I can 
conclude that the elicitation of  the leaders’ mood does not affect workers’ effort. Maybe the 
difference between treatment A and treatment C and between treatment A and treatment B is 
due to other factors instead of mood: from the panel regression 1 I found that the number of 
correct answers strongly depends on the offer of previous round. The endogeneity problem 
which occurred with this variable, that is the fact that the number of correct answers depends 
on the offer of previous round and then offer depends on the number of correct answers and 
                                                          
31 Treatment B is necessary to disentangle the effects of mood elicitation.  
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so on, was dealt with the use of a lagged number of correct answers in the regression: the 
strong significance of the coefficient of that variable gives evidence about the causal link 
between the workers’ effort and the leaders’ decisions to reward them.  
From this consideration I can accept the first null hypothesis of my experiment, Leaders’ 
Mood does not affect Workers’ Performance, contrary to what somehow I wished to get.   
I can attribute the outcome of this experiment to some  factors: basically, the design of the 
effort task was not accurate and not tested before to run the experiment. The 5 mathematical 
questions were of the following type:  
12 + 34 + 56 + 19 + 21 
Subjects were asked to sum these numbers without calculator and to write the results down. 
This effort task was first used by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and then it was adopted by 
other researchers (Oswald, Proto and Sgroi, 2009; Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 
forthcoming); differently from them, I decided to not use a time constraint since I thought 
that it was more complex in a paper and pencil experiment32. Actually, I could slightly 
change the procedure of the experiment and distribute the paper to workers at the exact 
moment in which they were allowed to start and collect all of them together. On the contrary, 
in this experiment, subjects were allowed to use all the time necessary: they took a long time 
to check their answers and hence the 68% answered correctly to all the questions.  
This happened also for the other set of 5 questions of the effort task for which subjects were 
asked to sum the ones in a table constituted of a series of zero and one. I chose this type of 
questions, used by Abeler (CREED-CeDEx-CBESS Meeting, 2009), instead of the GMAT-
MATH questions used by Oswald, Proto and Sgroi because I wished to avoid any possible 
compound effect of skill and effort. However, the decision to leave plenty of time to subject 
to answers to extremely easy questions compromised the possibility to measure the real 
effort of a task.  
Moreover, the 94.44% decided to attempt all the questions. Maybe workers, whatever 
the information on their co-participants’ mood was, felt somehow “obliged” to participate 
actively to the experiment: they may have thought “Since I am here and I must wait for 
others, why do not try to answer?”. For this reason I think that a computerized version of this 
                                                          
32
 A computerized version allows to visualize screens of the computer at a specific time. 
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experiment could bring different results: if a participant is matched with his or her partner by 
computer, his game is independent from other participants’ decisions; then, he or she could 
decide to save his/her own time and to skip some questions.  Moreover, I think that it would 
be better to not inform in advance participants about the number of rounds that they are 
going to play: a repeated version avoid the risk to take some types of decision just because 
you are aware that it is going to be your last move33.  
 
A point that deserves some consideration concerns the average elicited mood; the big 
majority of subjects declared to be happy. This bias is maybe due to the fact that most of 
them were foreign students on the point to leave and to come back home. Moreover, the 
experiment was run in June when the final examinations are already taken and so any 
student is surely more relaxed. We also would agree about the fact that people usually accept 
to take part to an experiment if they are not very busy. For all this reasons I believe that the 
use of a mood induction technique34 is actually more effective if the experimenter wishes to 
study the effect of the elicitation of all the main types of mood.  
A referee observed that the elicitation of mood could not reflect the real one and that 
subjects could play strategically, thinking that eliciting a good (or a bad) mood their co-
participant could put more effort with the consequence of a higher return to them. In this 
case, treatment B of this experiment is useful to disentangle that effect: leaders’ mood is 
elicited but not transmitted to workers. Moreover, even the case in which leaders played 
strategically does not represent a problem: the main aim of this experiment is to investigate 
on the mood effect on workers’ performance and not on the real elicitation of leaders’ mood.   
 
                                                          
33 Some workers decided to attempt all the questions in the second round even though they previously received a 
low offer just because they wanted to check at least another time whether their co-participant will behave fairly; on 
the other side, some leaders decided to give a lower offer in the second round because they knew that their co-
participant did not have the opportunity of a revengeful behavior. Those intention have been communicated to the 
experimenter during the experiment.      
34Psychologists developed a range of laboratory methods for inducing temporary mood states, e.g. self-statement, 
music, film, facial expression, game and social feedback, etc., in order to study the relation between emotions and 
cognition; the use of mood induction techniques is very successful: some of them – music, autobiographical recall, 
solitary recollection, film – induce the required mood in more than 75% of cases (Martin, 1990 p.680). 
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Both results obtained from univariate and multivariate analysis confirm the evidence 
that the second null hypothesis of this experiment will be rejected: in fact, leaders’ mood 
does not affect their offer decisions. There is no significant difference between offers of the 
three treatment which are going to depend only on the number of correct answers: higher the 
latter is more likely leaders are to reward workers. The Wald test of the panel regression 2 
suggests that actually the explanatory variables used in the regression, mood – treatments – 
interaction terms – etc., do not explain very well the behavior of the dependent variable; in 
other words, leaders decided to reward their co-participants on the basis of self-interest or 
fairness consideration instead to be influenced by their own mood.   
I have run another regression in which one of the dependent variable is the ratio 
between number of correct answers and the number of attempted questions: even though the 
coefficient of the ratio is statistically significant (p-value = 0.015), offer does not depend on 
that explanatory variable simply because leaders were not aware of the number of attempted 
answers but just of the correct ones.    
 Finally, I have run some panel regression per session: the results are similar to those of panel 
regression 1, with the number of correct answers as dependent variable, and to those of panel 
regression 2, with offer as dependent variable: in both regressions per session coefficients of 
mood dummies and of the interaction terms were never significant, thus confirming the 
results from the regressions run per subject.     
 
An important comment on the practice round has to be done. The practice round 
gives the possibility to participants to understand better their tasks and thus avoiding that 
they could play randomly. I decided to run the practice round with very easy questions35 
basically aiming at the clarification of the procedure of the experiment. However, I think that 
it would have been better to match participants differently from round 1 and 2 since workers 
completed their tasks in the first round with a sort of expectation on the future offer. 
Expectation that might have a role in the second round too. Otherwise, I could run the 
practice round without telling to workers about the offer made, or I could re-match 
                                                          
35 Example: 2 + 2. 
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participants at the beginning of each round, thus incurring in a non-independence 
observations issue.  
A claim on the possibility to built a reputation using the same pair over time can be made but 
I believe that this is not the case since I ran only 2 rounds.  
 
Finally, I would like to add that in my opinion this experiment could be improved by 
using a double blind procedure in order to minimize any possible distortion of subject 
behavior due to experimenter observation; this game, in fact, was paper and pencil, and 
communication has been made by the experimenter: subjects may be concerned about being 
judged as greedy or vengeful by the experimenter.   
 
 
VI. CONLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Economics was considered for a long time by philosophers as an offshoot of ethics 
but the mathematical assumptions of the economic models and the concept of rationality and 
self-interest claimed by the new classical economists gave to this discipline an appearance of 
a more precise science able to predict the economic behavior of agents. This “new dress” 
found the favor of many academics over time, shading the role of emotions in economic 
decision-making process.  
However, recently economists are slowly considering the psychological findings and 
trying to implement their model according to the new experimental evidence. 
My dissertation tries to summarize and to outline some of the main points of the 
related literature and adopts an experimental method in order to investigate on a topic so far 
not explored: the possible link between the leaders’ mood and workers’ performance. 
The experiment consists of three treatments: the main treatment in which mood is elicited 
and transmitted to the co-participant, the baseline in which mood is not elicited and another 
control treatment in which mood is elicited but not transmitted to the co-participant. Subjects 
play in pair: leaders and workers. The latter are asked to complete an effort tasks and the 
former are asked to play a bonus contract to reward, if they wish, their co-participant. 
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The hypotheses that I wanted to test derive straightforward from the following question: 
does mood affect economic decisions?  
I analyzed workers’ performance and leaders’ offer but the results I obtained are actually 
different from what I expected: mood seems not to influence economic behavior; however, 
some consideration have been made about the procedure of the experiment that can be 
improved in order to run a cleaner experiment on mood effect.  
The literature on mood effect on workers’ performance is not very large but many 
papers can be found on the workers’ incentives and on types of principal-agent contracts36: 
their finding can be used to implement a better experiment which could explore the 
importance of the role of the effect of leaders’ mood in different work setting. For example, 
Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002) were interested in workers’ effort in firms with different 
productivity levels: it would be interesting to see if effort levels in that setting could depend 
on emotions factors like fear, anxiety, etc.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Fehr, Klein and Schmidt, 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 2007; Abeler et al., 2009. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instruction Treatment A – participant A 
 
YOU ARE PARTICIPANT A 
 
Welcome to this experiment. Many thanks for attending today.  
 
This experiment concerns how people make decisions.  
 
You will be asked to carry out some tasks and you will be paid both a show-up fee of 3 
pounds and an amount up to an additional 10 pounds depending on a combination of luck 
and/or your skills.  
 
Your role in this experiment has been determined randomly and you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in this room. You will never be told with whom you have 
been paired and your performance/decisions will remain strictly anonymous.  
 
There are 2 types of participant: PARTICIPANT A and PARTICIPANT B. 
You can find on the top of the page which type of participant you are.  
Please do not reveal this information to other people during the experiment.   
 
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. Each round is divided in two stages: STAGE 1 and 
STAGE 2. 
Remember that each Participant A is randomly matched with a Participant B. 
 
ROUND 1 
 
STAGE 1 
 
Participant B will be asked to answer to a set of 10 mathematics questions. (It is her/his 
decision how many questions she/he wishes to answer). Once they finish they will raise their 
hand: the experimenter will write down on their paper the solutions and will count the 
correct answers.  
For every correct answer her/his co-participant – Participant A (YOU) – will get 1 Pound. 
 
The following table shows the connection between the number of correct answers of 
Participant B and the corresponding return to Participant A (YOU): 
 
Number of Correct 
Answers of 
Participant B  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Corresponding Return 
(in Pounds)  to  
Participant A (YOU) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A 
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At this stage Participant A (YOU) is kindly asked to wait. 
STAGE 2 
 
At this stage the experimenter will communicate the number of correct answers of 
Participant B to Participant A anonymously and hence the corresponding return in pounds to 
Participant A (YOU).  
Then Participant A (YOU) will be asked to decide how many pounds of them (if any) to keep 
and how many (if any) to give to Participant B. They will write down their decision on their 
sheet of paper. Once they finish they will raise their hand and the experimenter will record 
their decisions and communicate them to Participants B. 
 
Afterwards, ROUND 2 can start and you will be asked to do the above tasks again, STAGES 
1 to 2. 
 
Once Round 2 is over you will be asked to wait quietly: the experimenter will proceed to the 
payment. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
Only one round will be paid for real. 
A standard six sided dice will be rolled: if an odd number will appear, Round 1 will be paid; 
if an even number will appear, Round 2 will be paid.  
 
Please remember that all participants will also be paid a show-up fee of 3 pounds. 
 
Please do not communicate with other people during the experiment.  
Feel free to raise your hand at any time if you have any questions.  
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Participant A 
ROUND 1  
 
1. PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  21 + 23 + 45 + 67 + 88 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 34 + 14 + 44 + 67 + 19 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 51 + 65 + 21 + 13 + 33 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 82 – 13 + 49 + 72 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 19 + 45 – 21 + 48 + 25 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
   
1)  
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Participant A 
ROUND 2  
 
1. PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  34 + 22 + 15 + 82 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 11 + 54 + 27 + 81 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 31 + 61 + 33 + 25 + 16 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 90 – 12 + 33 + 55 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 15 + 66 – 20 + 38 + 21 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
   
1)  
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Participant A 
 PRACTICE ROUND   
 
1. PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 Please sum up the following number and 
write your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  2 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 3 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 4 + 4 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 5 – 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 6 – 3 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the 
following charts:  
 
   
1)  
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
 
 
 
 
__ 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
 
 
Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Instruction Treatment A – participant B 
 
YOU ARE PARTICIPANT B 
 
Welcome to this experiment. Many thanks for attending today.  
 
This experiment concerns how people make decisions.  
 
You will be asked to carry out some tasks and you will be paid both a show-up fee of 3 
pounds and an amount up to an additional 10 pounds depending on a combination of luck 
and/or your skills.  
 
Your role in this experiment has been determined randomly and you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in this room. You will never be told with whom you have 
been paired and your performance/decisions will remain strictly anonymous.  
 
There are 2 types of participant: PARTICIPANT A and PARTICIPANT B. 
You can find on the top of the page which type of participant you are.  
Please do not reveal this information to other people during the experiment.   
 
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. Each round is divided in two stages: STAGE 1 and 
STAGE 2. 
Remember that each Participant A is randomly matched with a Participant B. 
 
ROUND 1 
 
STAGE 1 
 
Participant B (YOU) will be asked to answer to a set of 10 mathematics questions. (It is 
her/his decision how many questions she/he wishes to answer). Once they finish they will 
raise their hand: the experimenter will write down on their paper the solutions and will 
count the correct answers.  
For every correct answer her/his co-participant – Participant A – will get 1 Pound.  
 
The following table shows the connection between the number of correct answers of 
Participant B and the corresponding return to Participant A: 
 
Number of Correct 
Answers of Participant 
B (YOU)   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Corresponding Return 
(in Pounds)  to  
Participant A  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
At this stage Participant A is kindly asked to wait. 
B 
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STAGE 2 
 
At this stage the experimenter will communicate the number of correct answers of 
Participant B (YOURS) to Participant A anonymously and hence the corresponding return in 
pounds to Participant A.  
Then Participant A will be asked to decide how many pounds of them (if any) to keep and 
how many (if any) to give to Participant B. They will write down their decision on their sheet 
of paper. Once they finish they will raise their hand and the experimenter will record their 
decisions and communicate them to Participants B. 
 
Afterwards, ROUND 2 can start and you will be asked to do the above tasks again, STAGES 
1 to 2. 
 
Once Round 2 is over you will be asked to wait quietly: the experimenter will proceed to the 
payment. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
Only one round will be paid for real. 
A standard six sided dice will be rolled: if an odd number will appear, Round 1 will be paid; 
if an even number will appear, Round 2 will be paid.  
 
Please remember that all participants will also be paid a show-up fee of 3 pounds. 
 
Please do not communicate with other people during the experiment.  
Feel free to raise your hand at any time if you have any questions.  
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Participant B 
ROUND 1  
 
1. Please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many questions you 
want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand.  Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you 
the correct answers and will count the number of your correct answers.  
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  21 + 23 + 45 + 67 + 88 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 34 + 14 + 44 + 67 + 19 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 51 + 65 + 21 + 13 + 33 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 82 – 13 + 49 + 72 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 19 + 45 – 21 + 48 + 25 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
   
1)  
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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Participant B 
ROUND 2  
 
1. Now please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many 
questions you want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand.  Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you 
the correct answers and will count the number of your correct answers.  
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  34 + 22 + 15 + 82 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 11 + 54 + 27 + 81 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 31 + 61 + 33 + 25 + 16 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 90 – 12 + 33 + 55 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 15 + 66 – 20 + 38 + 21 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts: 
   
1)  
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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Participant B 
 PRACTICE ROUND   
 
 
1. Now please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many 
questions you want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand. Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you 
the correct answers and will count the number of your correct answers.  
 
 Please sum up the following number and 
write your solution 
Your solution 
is: 
The Correct Answer 
is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  2 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 3 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 4 + 4 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 5 – 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 6 – 3 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the 
following charts:  
 
   
1)  
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
 
 
 
 
 
__ 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
 
Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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Instruction Treatment C – participant A 
YOU ARE PARTICIPANT A 
 
Welcome to this experiment. Many thanks for attending today.  
 
This experiment concerns how people make decisions.  
 
You will be asked to carry out some tasks and you will be paid both a show-up fee of 3 
pounds and an amount up to an additional 10 pounds depending on a combination of luck 
and/or your skills.  
 
Your role in this experiment has been determined randomly and you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in this room. You will never be told with whom you have 
been paired and your performance/decisions will remain strictly anonymous.  
 
There are 2 types of participant: PARTICIPANT A and PARTICIPANT B. 
You can find on the top of the page which type of participant you are.  
Please do not reveal this information to other people during the experiment.   
 
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. Each round is divided in three stages: STAGE 1, STAGE 
2 and STAGE 3. 
Remember that each Participant A is randomly matched with a Participant B. 
 
ROUND 1 
 
STAGE 1 
 
Participant A (YOU) makes the first move: she/he will be asked to answer one question and 
to write down her/his answer on a sheet of paper that she/he will be given. When they will 
finish they will be asked to raise their hand: the experimenter will record the answers 
anonymously on a sheet of paper. 
Participant B is kindly asked to wait. 
 
 STAGE 2 
 
At this stage Participant B, after receiving some initial information, will be asked to answer to 
a set of 10 mathematics questions. (It is her/his decision how many questions she/he wishes 
to answer). Once they finish they will raise their hand: the experimenter will write down on 
their paper the solutions and will count the correct answers.  
For every correct answer her/his co-participant – Participant A (YOU) – will get 1 Pound.  
The following table shows the connection between the number of correct answers of 
Participant B and the corresponding return to Participant A (YOU): 
 
A 
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Number of Correct 
Answers of Participant 
B  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Corresponding Return 
(in Pounds)  to  
Participant A (YOU) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
At this stage Participant A (YOU) is kindly asked to wait. 
 
STAGE 3 
 
At this stage the experimenter will communicate the number of correct answers of 
Participant B to Participant A anonymously and hence the corresponding return in pounds to 
Participant A (YOU).  
Then Participant A (YOU) will be asked to decide how many pounds of them (if any) to keep 
and how many (if any) to give to Participant B. They will write down their decision on their 
sheet of paper. Once they finish they will raise their hand and the experimenter will record 
their decisions and communicate them to Participants B. 
 
Afterwards, ROUND 2 can start and you will be asked to do the above tasks again, STAGES 
1 to 3. 
 
Once Round 2 is over you will be asked to wait quietly: the experimenter will proceed to the 
payment. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
Only one round will be paid for real. 
A standard six sided dice: if an odd number will appear, Round 1 will be paid; if an even 
number will appear, Round 2 will be paid.  
 
Please remember that all participants will also be paid a show-up fee of 3 pounds. 
 
Please do not communicate with other people during the experiment.  
Feel free to raise your hand at any time if you have any questions.  
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Participant A 
ROUND 1  
 
 
 
3. Please tick the box that matches your current mood: 
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
4. NOW PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND: the experimenter will come, record your answer and communicate 
it to your co-participant. 
 
 
5. NOW PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see 
below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer 
correct?  
1)  21 + 23 + 45 + 67 + 88 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 34 + 14 + 44 + 67 + 19 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 51 + 65 + 21 + 13 + 33 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 82 – 13 + 49 + 72 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 19 + 45 – 21 + 48 + 25 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
 
   
1)  
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
6. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Participant A 
ROUND 2  
 
 
 
1. Please tick the box that matches your current mood: 
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
 
2. NOW PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND: the experimenter will come, record your answer and communicate 
it to your co-participant. 
 
 
 
3. NOW PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see 
below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 
 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer 
correct?  
1)  34 + 22 + 15 + 82 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 11 + 54 + 27 + 81 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 31 + 61 + 33 + 25 + 16 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 90 – 12 + 33 + 55 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 15 + 66 – 20 + 38 + 21 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
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1)  
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
 
 
 
Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
4. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Participant A 
 PRACTICE ROUND   
 
 
 
3. Please tick the box that matches your current mood: 
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
4. NOW PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND: the experimenter will come, record your answer and communicate 
it to your co-participant. 
 
 
 
5. NOW PLEASE WAIT: your co-participant is answering to the mathematics questions that you can see 
below.  
The experimenter will tell you the number of correct answers of your co-participant and your 
corresponding return. 
 
 
 
 Please sum up the following number and 
write your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  2 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 3 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 4 + 4 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 5 – 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 6 – 3 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the 
following charts:  
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1)  
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
 
 
 
 
 
__ 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
 
 
 
 
Your co-participant has answered correctly to ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
Your corresponding return is  _______  
 
 
 
6. NOW PLEASE MAKE YOUR DECISION: how much do you want to give to your co-participant (if any)? 
 
 
 
I GIVE ________ POUND(S) TO MY CO-PARTICIPANT 
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Instruction Treatment C – participant B 
YOU ARE PARTICIPANT B 
 
Welcome to this experiment. Many thanks for attending today.  
 
This experiment concerns how people make decisions.  
 
You will be asked to carry out some tasks and you will be paid both a show-up fee of 3 
pounds and an amount up to an additional 10 pounds depending on a combination of luck 
and/or your skills.  
 
Your role in this experiment has been determined randomly and you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in this room. You will never be told with whom you have 
been paired and your performance/decisions will remain strictly anonymous.  
 
There are 2 types of participant: PARTICIPANT A and PARTICIPANT B. 
You can find on the top of the page which type of participant you are.  
Please do not reveal this information to other people during the experiment.   
 
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. Each round is divided in three stages: STAGE 1, STAGE 
2 and STAGE 3. 
Remember that each Participant A is randomly matched with a Participant B. 
 
ROUND 1 
 
STAGE 1 
 
Participant A makes the first move: she/he will be asked to answer one question and to write 
down her/his answer on a sheet of paper that she/he will be given. When they will finish they 
will be asked to raise their hand: the experimenter will record the answers anonymously on a 
sheet of paper. 
Participant B (YOU) is kindly asked to wait. 
 
 STAGE 2 
 
At this stage Participant B (YOU), after receiving some initial information, will be asked to 
answer to a set of 10 mathematics questions. (It is her/his decision how many questions 
she/he wishes to answer). Once they finish they will raise their hand: the experimenter will 
write down on their paper the solutions and will count the correct answers.  
For every correct answer her/his co-participant – Participant A – will get 1 Pound.  
The following table shows the connection between the number of correct answers of 
Participant B and the corresponding return to Participant A: 
 
B 
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Number of Correct 
Answers of Participant 
B (YOU)   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Corresponding Return 
(in Pounds)  to  
Participant A  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
At this stage Participant A is kindly asked to wait. 
 
STAGE 3 
 
At this stage the experimenter will communicate the number of correct answers of 
Participant B (YOURS) to Participant A anonymously and hence the corresponding return in 
pounds to Participant A.  
Then Participant A will be asked to decide how many pounds of them (if any) to keep and 
how many (if any) to give to Participant B. They will write down their decision on their sheet 
of paper. Once they finish they will raise their hand and the experimenter will record their 
decisions and communicate them to Participants B. 
 
Afterwards, ROUND 2 can start and you will be asked to do the above tasks again, STAGES 
1 to 3. 
 
Once Round 2 is over you will be asked to wait quietly: the experimenter will proceed to the 
payment. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
Only one round will be paid for real. 
A standard six sided dice: if an odd number will appear, Round 1 will be paid; if an even 
number will appear, Round 2 will be paid.  
 
Please remember that all participants will also be paid a show-up fee of 3 pounds. 
 
 
 
Please do not communicate with other people during the experiment.  
Feel free to raise your hand at any time if you have any questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Participant B 
ROUND 1  
 
 
 
1. Please wait. Your co-participant is answering to a question. 
The experimenter will tell you her/his answer. 
 
Your co-participant has the following mood:  
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Now please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many 
questions you want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand.  
Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you the correct answers and will count 
the number of your correct answers.  
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 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer 
correct?  
1)  21 + 23 + 45 + 67 + 88 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 34 + 14 + 44 + 67 + 19 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 51 + 65 + 21 + 13 + 33 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 82 – 13 + 49 + 72 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 19 + 45 – 21 + 48 + 25 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
 
   
1)  
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
 
 
3. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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Participant B 
ROUND 2  
 
 
 
3. Please wait. Your co-participant is answering to a question. 
The experimenter will tell you her/his answer. 
 
Your co-participant has the following mood:  
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
 
4. Now please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many 
questions you want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand.  
Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you the correct answers and will count 
the number of your correct answers.  
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 Please sum up the following number and write 
your solution 
 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer 
correct?  
1)  34 + 22 + 15 + 82 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 11 + 54 + 27 + 81 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 31 + 61 + 33 + 25 + 16 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 90 – 12 + 33 + 55 – 15 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 15 + 66 – 20 + 38 + 21 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the following 
charts:  
 
   
1)  
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
__ 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
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Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
 
 
5. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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Participant B 
 PRACTICE ROUND   
 
 
3. Please wait. Your co-participant is answering to a question. 
The experimenter will tell you her/his answer. 
 
Your co-participant has the following mood:  
 
 
I AM IN A GOOD MOOD □ 
 
I AM NEITHER IN A GOOD 
MOOD OR IN A BAD MOOD 
□ 
 
I AM IN A BAD MOOD □ 
 
 
 
4. Now please ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. You are free to decide how many 
questions you want to answer. 
You are not allowed to use any calculator. Please use the blank paper on your desk if you need. If you 
need more please raise your hand.  
Once you finish please raise your hand; the experimenter will tell you the correct answers and will count 
the number of your correct answers.  
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 Please sum up the following number and 
write your solution 
Your 
solution is: 
The Correct 
Answer is 
Is your answer correct?  
1)  2 + 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
2) 3 + 3 =   □ Yes   □ No 
3) 4 + 4 =   □ Yes   □ No 
4) 5 – 2 =   □ Yes   □ No 
5) 6 – 3 =    □ Yes   □ No 
 Please sum up the ones present in the 
following charts:  
 
   
1)  
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
2)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
__ 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
3)  
 
 
 
 
 
__ 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
  
□ Yes   □ No 
4)  
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
5)  
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
1 0 1 
__ 
  
□ Yes, □ No 
 
 
 
 
Your correct answer(s) is/are ______ out of 10 questions. 
 
The corresponding return of your co-participant is ______ Pound(s) 
 
 
 
5. NOW PLEASE WAIT. You co-participant is making her/his decision.  
She/he is deciding how much (if any) she/he wants to give to you. 
 
 
 
YOU ARE GIVEN ________ POUND(S) 
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COMMUNICATION FORM  
 
 
 
Pair Leaders’ Mood  Number of Correct 
Answers 
Offer 
1 G       N        B    
2 G       N        B   
3 G       N        B   
4 G       N        B   
5 G       N        B   
6 G       N        B   
    
    
    
 
 
G   = good mood 
N  =  normal mood 
B  = bad mood
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APPENDIX B.  
 
Tab. 1. Descriptive statistics for the ratio “Number of Correct Answers/ Number of 
Attempted Questions” 
 
N. Correct A. / N. 
Attempted 
Questions 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
 72 0.9375     0.1418564 0 1 
 
 
Tab. 2 Descriptive statistics for the ratio “Number of Correct Answers/ Number of Attempted 
Questions”, per treatment 
 
N. Correct A. / 
N. Attempted 
Questions 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Treat A 22 0.8954545     0.1132939          0.7 1 
Treat B 24 0.9416667 0.2062431           0 1 
Treat C 26 0.9692308 0.0679366          0.8 1 
 
 
Tab. 3 Frequencies of Number of Correct Answers of Round 1 
 
Number of 
Correct 
Answers of 
Round 1 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
4 1 2.78 2.78 
5 2 5.56 8.33 
7 2 5.56 13.89 
8 5 13.89 27.78 
9 4 11.11 38.89 
10 22 1.11 100.00 
Total 36 100.00  
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Tab. 4 Frequencies of Number of Correct Answers of Round 2 
 
Number of 
Correct 
Answers of 
Round 2 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 1 2.78 2.78 
8 4 11.11 13.89 
9 4 11.11 25.00 
10 27 75.00 100.00 
Total 36 100.00  
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Graph 1. Number of Correct Answers – 
first round treat A 
Graph 2. Number of Correct Answers – 
second round treat A 
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Graph 3. Number of Correct Answers – 
first round treat B 
Graph 4. Number of Correct Answers – 
second round treat B 
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Graph 5. Number of Correct Answers – 
first round treat C 
Graph 6. Number of Correct Answers – 
second round treat C 
 
 
Tab. 5. Offer Frequencies 
Offer Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
0 10 13.89 13.89 
1 4 5.56 19.44 
2 4 5.56 25.00 
3 11 15.28 40.28 
4 7 9.72 50.00 
4.5 1 1.39 51.39 
5 25 34.72 86.11 
6 2 2.78 88.89 
7 2 2.78 91.67 
8 2 2.78 94.44 
9 1 1.39 95.83 
10 3 4.17 100.00 
Total 72 100.00  
 
 
 
 
